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Purpose: The aim of the present study is to provide an in-depth description of the 
communicative errors made by participants with closed-head injury (CHI). 
Method: A group of 30 individuals with CHI and normal matched controls took part 
in the experiment. They were presented with a series of short videotaped vignettes 
depicting everyday social exchanges and tested on comprehension and production of 
different kinds of communicative acts (direct and indirect speech acts, irony and 
deceit). The participants’ answers were evaluated as correct or incorrect. Incorrect 
answers were then further rated as totally incorrect or with the presence of 
intermediate errors.  
Results: Individuals with CHI performed worse than controls on all the tasks 
investigated when considering correct vs. incorrect answers. Furthermore, a series of 
logistic regression analyses showed that group membership (CHI vs. controls) 
significantly predicted the occurrence of intermediate errors in responses on both 
comprehension and production tasks.  
Conclusion: Participants with CHI tend to have marked difficulty understanding and 
producing different types of communicative acts, and make more intermediate errors 
than control participants. The findings support a theoretical framework of 
communication in which the comprehension and production of communicative acts 
are viewed as step-by-step processes rather than as "all-or-none" phenomena.  
 
 




The aim of the present study is to provide an articulated description of 
pragmatic errors made by individuals with with closed-head injury (CHI) in the 
comprehension and production of several pragmatic phenomena, i.e. direct and 
indirect communicative acts, deceit and irony, expressed using both the linguistic and 
extralinguistic modalities.  
Several studies in the literature have reported a range of communicative deficits 
in individuals with CHI when tested on different pragmatic phenomena. The term 
pragmatics refers to a number of communicative behaviors that are concerned with 
how language is used to convey meanings in context (see Levinson, 1983), and in 
particular with the relationship between what speakers say and what they mean or 
intend to communicate (e.g., Gibbs, 1999). Individuals with CHI have difficulty going 
beyond the literal meaning of utterances (e.g., Winner & Gardner, 1977), and in 
understanding what is implied, as in the case of the comprehension of indirect speech 
acts and irony (Bara, Tirassa, & Zettin, 1997), sarcastic utterances (McDonald & 
Pearce, 1996), humor (Braun, Lissier, Baribeau, & Ethier, 1989; Docking, Murdoch, 
& Jordan, 2000), and commercial messages which require inferential processes in 
order to be understood (Pearce, McDonald, & Coltheart, 1998). Individuals with CHI 
are also impaired in the production of specific types of verbal communicative acts, for 
example, in producing correct requests (McDonald & Van Sommers, 1993), or in 
giving the interlocutor sufficiently detailed information (McDonald, 1993). Numerous 
studies have also documented a variety of subtle communicative impairments in 
conversational discourse (e.g., Coelho, 2002; Coelho, Youse, Le, & Feinn, 2003; 
Johnson & Turkstra, 2012; Togher, Power, Tate, McDonald, & Rietdijk, 2010; 
Turksra, Brehm, & Montgomery, 2006). At the level of discourse, individuals with 
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CHI may produce narratives with increased errors of cohesion and coherence (e.g., 
Hartley & Jensen, 1991; Marini, Galetto, Zampieri, Vorano, Zettin, & Carlomagno, 
2011), and may show difficulties in the macrolinguistic organization of their 
narratives and in conveying appropriate information at the level of story structure 
organization (e.g., Carlomagno, Giannotti, Vorano, & Marini, 2011).  
Dardier and colleagues (2011) recently conducted a detailed analysis of the 
pragmatic aspects of language use by individuals with traumatic brain injury (TBI), 
examining both comprehension (i.e., hints, direct, and indirect requests) and 
production ability (i.e., conversation) during an interview situation. The authors 
showed that the pragmatic skills of persons with TBI vary across tasks: patients 
demonstrated weakness (in topic maintenance) but also strengths (in turn-taking, 
comprehension of requests and hints). 
The ability to comprehend and produce communicative acts using the 
extralinguistic modality is also impaired in these individuals (Bara, Cutica, & Tirassa, 
2001). Rousseaux and colleagues (2010) evaluated both verbal and non-verbal aspects 
of communication in individuals with TBI in dyadic interactions and found that, 
during the chronic phase, they showed marked difficulties in speech outflow and 
pragmatic language, i.e., responding to open questions, presenting new information 
and introducing new themes, organizing discourse and adapting to interlocutor 
language. However, the authors did not exclude patients with performance below the 
cut-off scores on aphasia testing, and this could have contributed to explaining their 
difficulties with verbal communication. As far as non-verbal communication is 
concerned, patients were impaired in understanding and producing gestures, in 
affective expressivity, in feedback management and pragmatics (i.e., prosody, 
orienting gaze, using regulatory mimogestuality, and turn-taking). 
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Angeleri and colleagues (2008) provided a comprehensive assessment of 
communicative deficits in TBI patients, evaluating different expressive modalities, 
encompassing linguistic, extralinguistic and paralinguistic aspects. The authors 
showed that individuals with TBI are impaired, to varying degrees of severity, in the 
comprehension and production of a wide range of pragmatic tasks, such as direct 
speech acts, (sentences that communicate exactly and literally what the speaker 
intends to say), indirect speech acts (sentences that communicate to the listener more 
than what the speaker is actually literally saying), irony, deceit, and sensitivity to the 
violation of Grice’s maxims. 
The ability to recognize, interpret, and express communicative intentions plays 
a key role in human social life: the integration of these factors requires social 
cognition—the ability to construct representations of the relations between oneself 
and others, and to use those representations flexibly to guide social behavior (e.g., 
Adolphs, 2001). This ability to coordinate cognition, emotion regulation, and social 
competence in novel or complex situations requiring goal-directed behavior is 
considered a part of executive functioning (e.g., Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004). 
Impaired executive functioning is associated with focal and diffuse frontal lesions 
(e.g., Eslinger, Zappalà, Chakara, & Barrett, 2007; Mozeiko, Le, Coelho, Krueger, & 
Grafman, 2011); in individuals with TBI, difficulties in social cognition may be 
particularly evident when the injury involves the frontal lobes (Chapman, 1997). 
Various studies have reported impairments in social aspects of communication after 
TBI, including difficulty in discriminating social cues, empathy, theory of mind, and 
perspective-taking (e.g., Bibby & McDonald, 2005; de Sousa et al., 2010; Turkstra, 
McDonald, & DePompei, 2001; Ylvisaker, 1998; McDonald, 2012). 
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It is thus well-established that patients with CHI have difficulty interpreting and 
responding appropriately to a range of communicative and social cues, including 
verbal language, prosody, and extralinguistic information. Hence, a pragmatic 
approach to the assessment of clinical language problems has led to the development 
of a number of evaluation measures. 
Pragmatic measures share the multidimensional perspective of both linguistic 
and non-linguistic measures and include, among others, the Pragmatic Protocol 
(Prutting & Kirchner, 1987), the Profile of Communicative Appropriateness (PCA; 
Penn, 1988), and the Communicative Abilities in Daily Living (CADL; Holland, 
1980; CADL-2; Holland, Frattali, & Fromm, 1998). All the measures are able to 
identify specific areas of communicative impairment observing the patients’  natural 
conversation (Pragmatic Protocol; PCA) or involving them in role-play activities 
reproducing everyday social situations (CADL-2).  
“The Awareness of Social Inference Test” (TASIT; McDonald, Flanagan, 
Rollins, & Kinch, 2003), divides the comprehension of social exchanges into different 
components. TASIT assesses both the ability to make judgments about the mental and 
emotional state of the speakers (TASIT Part I) and the ability to interpret social 
inference (TASIT Part II). In the social inference test, to capture distinct facets of the 
inferential process, the comprehension of verbal exchanges is assessed via four 
questions: (a) thinking question, to determine whether individuals are capable of 
making judgments about what different speakers know when interpreting social 
inference; (b) doing question, to assess the ability to judge speaker intention; (c) 
feeling question, to determine whether the patient is capable of assessing feelings 
based on expression or intonation; and (d) saying question, to determine the ability to 
detect the intended meaning of the literal content. In the case of TASIT, the distinct 
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scores for the different kinds of inferential judgments about the speakers and their 
internal states are generally equivalent in difficulty, and are not intended to represent 
a hierarchical structure. 
In line with this perspective, the present study aims to analyze pragmatic 
abilities in individuals with CHI by parceling out the comprehension and production 
of communicative acts into distinct components, with the expectation that participants 
with CHI will show different levels of performance, i.e. they will make different 
intermediate errors, by failing at different steps of the process. Managing 
conversation involves a number of steps, each of which may possibly represent a 
different level of skill in comprehension/production. In particular, we parceled out the 
comprehension and production of communicative acts into distinct hierarchical 
components (i.e., from the easiest to the most demanding). 
The novelty of the present study is that it investigates the communicative ability 
of individuals with CHI from a new perspective, by (i) providing a robust theoretical 
background that supports the use of these components in clinical practice, (ii) 
examining both the comprehension and the production of communicative acts, and 
(iii) including both the linguistic and the extralinguistic expressive modalities.  
To achieve these goals, the linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the 
Assessment Battery of Communication—ABaCo (Sacco et al., 2008; Bosco, 
Angeleri, Zuffranieri, Bara, & Sacco, 2012) were used in the present study. The 
battery was built on the basis of the Cognitive Pragmatics theory, which is able to 
predict and explain the development of pragmatic ability in children (Bosco, Bara & 
Bucciarelli, 2004; 2006; Bosco & Bucciarelli, 2008) and the decay of pragmatic 
performance in subjects with traumatic brain injury (Bara, Tirassa & Zettin, 1997; 
Angeleri et al. 2008). The battery was chosen for its capability to identify a wide 
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range of pragmatic deficits, as shown in a previous study in a group of 21 participants 
with CHI (Angeleri et al., 2008). Administering the same test increased the likelihood 
of detecting a sufficient number of erroneous answers to analyze. Furthermore, the 
idea of the present study was to analyze both the comprehension and production of 
communicative acts, and the two selected scales of the battery provided specific items 
for testing both these abilities. For the present study, the sample was extended to 
include 30 participants with CHI, and the analyses were performed in a completely 
new way with respect to previous research. 
The Comprehension and Production of a Communicative Act 
In the philosophy of language, communication consists of an agent's intentional 
action overtly aimed at the modification of a partner’s mental states (Austin, 1962; 
Searle, 1969; Grice, 1975). A mental state is a theoretical construct created in order to 
describe, predict and explain human behavior (Premak & Woodruf, 1978). Mental 
states are mental representations such as knowledge, beliefs, sharedness, 
expectancies, desires, intentions, hopes, fears and so on (Tirassa, Bosco & Colle 
2006a, 2006b; Bosco, Colle, Bono, Ruberti & Tirassa, 2009). Intentional 
communication consists in a person's action that aims to modify one or more of the 
partner’s internal states, e.g. the actor may intend to share something with his/her 
partner, to induce him/her to believe something, to induce him/her to do something, 
and so on.  
Within the linguistic domain, Wigand (1999) proposed the process of "coming 
to understanding" in dialogical interactions as a model of harmonious 
communication: the author considers non-comprehension and misunderstanding as an 
integral part of the comprehension process rather than as a simple breakdown (see 
also Dascal, 1985; Kreutz & Roberts, 1993).  
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Underlying the idea that non-comprehension and misunderstanding are intrinsic 
parts of the communicative process is the Principle of Cooperation (Grice, 1957), 
according to which conversations are cooperative efforts where the participants 
recognize a common purpose. The Principle of Cooperation may be violated 
intentionally or unconsciously, to convey a different meaning than what is literally 
spoken. A classic example is deceit, where the speaker says something that is not true 
in order to deceive her/his listener, violating the Maxim of Quality (“Do not say what 
you believe to be false”) included in the Principle of Cooperation. In the case of irony, 
there is still a violation of the same Maxim (i.e., the speaker says something untrue, 
opposite to the literal meaning), but for a purpose that is totally different from deceit. 
In the present study, Grice’s notion of cooperation was used to explore the 
comprehension and production of different communicative acts; for example, in tasks 
involving the comprehension of deceit and irony, the idea was to assess sensitivity to 
the violation (i.e., the speaker didn’t tell the truth), and understanding of the 
communicative purpose (i.e., why the speaker didn’t tell the truth).    
Within this general framework, Airenti, Bara and Colombetti (1993a) 
proposed the theory of Cognitive Pragmatics to deal with the cognitive processes 
involved in comprehending and producing communicative acts (for the most recent 
development of the theory, see Bara, 2010). According to this theory, the 
comprehension/production of a communicative act occurs in a sequence of distinct 
steps:   
 Expression act. The partner reconstructs the actor's mental state starting from 
the literal act. The conversation game in the present phase sets up the task of 
recognizing the actor's expression act. Note that the use of the terms actor and partner 
Communicative errors in patients with CHI 
 
 11 
- instead of speaker and hearer - was intended to highlight that the theory refers to 
both linguistic and extralinguistic communication. 
 Actor's meaning. The partner recognizes the meaning of the utterance when he 
reconstructs the actor's communicative intention.  
 Communicative effect. The communicative effect on the partner is the entire 
set of the partner’s mental states, acquired or modified as a result of the 
communicative intentions expressed by the actor.  
 At this point the partner produces the intention he wants to communicate in his 
response; it is the result of the effects of the communicative act. 
Response. Then the partner produces an overt communicative response (an action or 
an utterance), as an answer to the actor’s communicative act. 
 The comprehension/generation process is continuous in that the generation of 
an answer on the part of the partner may constitute the starting point for a new 
comprehension process on the part of the actor, who in turn will produce a new 
communicative act. 
Communicative errors or failures—that is, unsuccessful attempts to produce an 
intended effect in the interlocutor—may occur in any phase of the communicative 
process (Airenti, Bara, & Colombetti, 1993b; see also Bosco, Bucciarelli, & Bara, 
2006, and Bosco, Bono, & Bara, 2012). In the theoretical framework adopted for this 
study, a successful communicative act is thus not an “all-or-none” phenomenon but is, 
by contrast, a graduated process that can be fully or partially completed.  
The present paper explores the possibility that, even if individuals with CHI 
may fail to fully comprehend or produce the various communicative tasks 
investigated (i.e., to achieve the communicative effect phase), they may nonetheless 
demonstrate an "intermediate level" of comprehension/production ability, 
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corresponding to the achievement of the expression act or actor’s meaning phase in 
the comprehension/production process described above.  
To investigate this aspect, an in-depth analysis of participants’ performance on 
the linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the Assessment Battery for Communication 
(Sacco et al., 2008) was conducted. Focusing on participants' answers traditionally 
coded as "wrong", a distinction was made between "totally wrong" and "intermediate 
errors". In particular, the latter cases, in which participants failed to achieve the full 
comprehension/production of a communicative act were further analyzed to assess the 
level at which the comprehension/production process was interrupted. Accordingly, 
the participants’ responses were considered as “presence of intermediate errors” when 
they failed the final comprehension/production step, but had passed one of the 
previous steps of the comprehension/production process, and as “totally wrong” when 
they failed all steps. The occurrence of intermediate errors was then described and 
quantified with the aim of exploring the hypothesis that participants with CHI 
produce "intermediate errors" more frequently than those without brain injury in the 
control group.  
Method 
Participants 
Two groups participated in the present study: a group of individuals with CHI 
and a normal control group. The CHI group consisted of 30 participants with closed-
head injury (24 male/6 female) ranging in age from 20 to 68 years (M = 37.13; SD = 
11.36); their education ranged from 5 to 18 years of schooling (M = 11.1; SD = 3.29). 
Based on clinical evaluation, participants were classified as victims of moderate to 
severe head injury. The participants with CHI were recruited through different 
rehabilitation centers in Geneva and in Turin (Italy) following head injury. The time 
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after onset ranged from 3 to 252 months (M = 60.1; SD = 64.21). All participants with 
CHI had sustained their injury in traffic accidents, all resulting in closed-head injury. 
All had traumatic brain injury characterized as diffuse; however, most participants 
also suffered from focal damage resulting from inertial forces in different areas of the 
brain, and detected by MRI scan. Table 1 presents the participants’ clinical details.  
 
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
 
At the time of the study, all participants with CHI were in a post-acute phase; 
they were living at home with their caregiver (partner/family). Subjects with CHI had 
to meet the following inclusion criteria to participate in the study: (1) be at least 18 
years of age; (2) be at least 3 months post-brain injury; (3) be Italian native speakers; 
(4) provide their informed consent; and (5) have adequate cognitive and 
communicative skills, tested by the achievement of a cut-off score in the following 
neuropsychological tests: MiniMental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, 
& McHugh, 1975; cut-off: 24/30); denomination scale of the Aachener Aphasie Test 
(AAT, Huber, Poeck, Weniger, & Willmes, 1983; cut-off: no deficit) and Token Test 
(De Renzi & Vignolo, 1962; cut-off: 5/6). None of the participants reported a history 
of neurological disease, psychiatric illness, previous head injury, stroke, antipsychotic 
medication use or substance abuse disorder. All participants were right-handed. The 
control group consisted of 30 healthy individuals, closely matched to the participant 
with CHI in terms of gender (24 male/6 female), age (M = 36.47; SD = 10.95; t(58) = 
.23, p = .82, 95% CI [-5.10, 6.43]) and years of education (M = 10.8; SD = 3.23; t(58) 
= .36, p = .72, 95% CI [-1.39, 1.99]). None of them had other brain damage or a 
history of neurological disorders. The Battery protocol was approved by the Ethics 
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Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Turin (Italy). 
Material 
The linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the Assessment Battery of 
Communication (ABaCo, Sacco et al., 2008) were administered to the participants. 
Only the linguistic and extralinguistic scales - and not the other scales included in the 
Battery (i.e., paralinguistic, context and conversational scales) - were analyzed 
because the linguistic and extralinguistic scales investigate the most complex, and - 
for the goal of the present research - most interesting pragmatic phenomena, namely: 
standard (indirect) communicative acts, deceit, and irony. Each scale is made up of 24 
items (8 standard communicative acts, 8 deceits, and 8 ironies), equally divided into 
comprehension (12 items) and production tasks (12 items), for a total of 48 items. All 
the tasks consisted in videotaped scenes (lasting 20-25 seconds) where two actors 
were engaged in communicative exchanges. For the comprehension tasks, the two 
actors performed an everyday communicative exchange that might typically occur 
between a couple, two colleagues, or two friends, and the participants were asked to 
understand what happened, while for the production tasks only one actor performed a 
communicative act and the participants were asked to complete the dialogue from the 
interlocutor’s perspective (see also the Procedure section). On the linguistic scale all 
communicative acts were performed linguistically and comprised a controlled number 
of words (range: 7± 2), while on the extralinguistic scale all communicative acts were 
performed through gestures. The tasks were randomized across participants. Some 
examples of the tasks are provided in Appendix B.  
Procedure 
Both the neuropsychological battery and the experimental protocol were 
administered individually to the participants, during two subsequent sessions each 
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lasting about one hour. Participants with CHI were tested at their rehabilitation 
centers, while those in the control group were tested at home. 
Comprehension task. 
The examiner showed the participants short videos where two agents were 
engaged in a communicative interaction: the actor asked his partner a question and the 
partner replied. The participants had to understand the partner’s communicative act. 
On the linguistic scale the actors communicated verbally, whereas on the 
extralinguistic scale they communicated through gestures alone. 
Production task. 
The examiner showed the participants short videos where two agents were 
engaged in a communicative interaction: the actor said something to the partner, the 
video stopped and the participants were asked to answer the actor from the partner’s 
perspective. On the linguistic scale the communicative interaction occurred in the 
linguistic modality and the participants had to reply verbally. On the extralinguistic 
scale the actor performed communicative gestures without any linguistic support and 
the participants had to reply using gestures alone. 
To summarize, the experimental protocol used for this study comprised both the 
linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the ABaCo, which encompass both linguistic 
and extralinguistic modalities, including standard, deceit, and irony tasks. The tasks 
were created to be as similar as possible to everyday interactions, and to reflect 
participants’ communicative performance in daily life. We are aware that the 
experimental tasks may have required some metacognitive and metalinguistic 
reasoning, which played an important role in participants’ understanding of the 
situations that were presented; this cannot be avoided when using videotaped 
vignettes depicting social interactions. However, since all the tasks presented in the 
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study required a similar level of metacognitive reasoning, there is no reason to expect 
systematic effects on performance for the different tasks. 
Scoring procedure 
The experimental sessions were video-recorded. The participants’ performance 
was coded off-line from the videotapes by two independent judges, blind with respect 
to the aims of the research. The two judges recorded the participants’ scores on 
specific score sheets while watching the video-recorded experimental sessions. 
The following dimensions were used to score the participants’ responses: 
1. Expression act 
2. Actor’s meaning 
3. Violation 
4. Purpose 
These specific dimensions correspond to specific phases of the 
comprehension/generation process previously described (Bara, 2010; see the 
"Comprehension and production of a communicative act" paragraph), and to the 
respect vs. violation of Grice's Principle of Cooperation (Grice, 1989), and were used 
to guide the raters and ensure accurate scoring (see Appendix A for a schematic 
representation of these dimensions). With respect to the comprehension/production 
process derived from the Cognitive Pragmatics Theory described above, the original 
final step (i.e., communicative effect) was further divided into two separate steps 
(violation of cooperation and purpose of violation), in line with Grice’s Principle of 
Cooperation (Grice, 1989). From a procedural point of view, each scoring dimension 
corresponds to a specific question that the examiner asked the participant while 
administering the battery: based on the participant’s answers to each of these 
questions, the raters were able to ascertain whether they had passed the corresponding 
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dimension (1 = passed; 0 = not passed). For each dimension passed the answer 
received a score of 1. Appendix B reports some examples. The following section 
provides a detailed description of each specific dimension used to guide the scoring 
process. 
Comprehension task dimensions score. 
Expression act. The participant passed the dimension if s/he recognized what 
the actor expressed, i.e. the content of the expression act through which the actor 
grasped her partner’s attention. Simply repeating what the actor said (echo) was not 
sufficient to demonstrate comprehension; participants had to produce at least a 
paraphrase as proof of actually having understood the expression. For example, 
supposing the actor in the videotaped scene says “It wasn’t my fault” in order to avoid 
a punishment: the examiner then asked the participant: “What did the actor mean?”; if 
the participant answered “It wasn’t my fault” (echo), that was not sufficient to 
establish s/he had actually recognized the expressed content; thus the participant had 
to be evaluated on the basis of the following in-depth question "What does that 
mean". By contrast, if the participant answered “That it wasn’t his fault” (paraphrase), 
s/he was deemed to have recognized the expressed content and thus passed the 
dimension. On the extralinguistic scale, simple repetition refers both to the repetition 
of the same gesture performed by the actor and to the linguistic echo. For example, 
supposing the actor in the scene asked “Will I see you later?” and the partner 
performed the “OK” gesture in reply: if the participant simply repeated the same 
gesture or uttered “OK”, these were considered mere repetitions; by paraphrasing a 
gesture we refer to a minimal explanation of the gesture, such as “Yes, I’ll see you 
later”. 
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Actor’s meaning. The participant passed the dimension if s/he explained what 
the utterance/gesture implied or presupposed. For example, supposing the actress in 
the vignette says “I’m glad that you appreciated my effort” in response to her friend’s 
question: “Who cooked the delicious dinner?”; the examiner then asked the 
participant: “What did the actress mean?”; if the participant answered “That she’s 
happy that her effort was appreciated”, that was not sufficient to establish that s/he 
had recognized the actor’s meaning; the examiner then asked “What does that 
mean?”, and if the participant also described that the sentence implied that she was 
the one who cooked the dinner, s/he was deemed to have recognized the actor’s 
meaning and thus passed the corresponding dimension.  
Violation of cooperation (truthfulness). The participant passed the dimension if 
s/he explained that what the actor said was not true (or not serious) or, in the case of 
irony, that the actor was communicating more than what was literally said. 
Purpose of violation. The participant passed the dimension if s/he explained the 
reason why the actor produced her communicative act, for example if s/he explained 
that the actor expressed something false in order to hide her guilt (deceit) or as a joke 
(irony).  
Please note that in the majority of the experimental studies investigating 
pragmatic skills in participants with TBI (see for example Bara, Tirassa & Zettin, 
1997; Bara, Cutica & Tirassa, 2001; Angeleri et al. 2008; Dardier et al. 2011), a 
wrong answer to this last dimension (that we have called purpose of violation but that 
may, of course, be described by other researchers using other labels having a similar 
conceptual meaning) is usually regarded as evidence of complete failure on the task. 
The previous dimensions of the comprehension/production process are typically 
collapsed into this final one. Based on the assumption that such different dimensions 
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correspond to specific phases in the comprehension of a communicative act, the 
present study aims to investigate these dimensions separately, in order to clarify 
exactly where in the comprehension process the impairment arises. 
It is important to highlight that not all the pragmatic phenomena investigated 
required the same dimensions of analysis: as displayed in Appendix A, for example, 
the comprehension of a standard communicative act does not require any violation of 
cooperation (i.e., the actor depicted in the vignette told the truth), nor any purpose of 
violation (i.e., no intention to deceive, nor to be ironic), while the comprehension of a 
deceit requires sensitivity to the violation of cooperation (i.e., the actor told a lie), and 
understanding of the purpose of the violation (i.e., the intention to deceive). 
Production task dimensions score. 
The dimensions for the production of communicative acts are listed below.  
Expression act. The participant passed the dimension if she/he produced a 
communicative act that was congruent with respect to the test question. The act 
produced had to be an utterance on the linguistic scale, or a gesture on the 
extralinguistic scale. 
Actor’s meaning. The participant passed the dimension if she/he produced a 
communicative act that was plausible with respect to the communicative context, and 
if there was a logical connection between the patient’s answer and the context shared 
by the participants in the interaction. In other words, the act had to be unambiguous 
and easily understood by the interlocutor, i.e. the rater had to find an answer to the 
test question in the act. For example, suppose that, in reply to the question “What 
would you like to do this afternoon?”, the participant answered “I'd like to go to 
Mars”: this answer is consistent with the question (expressed content), since 
indicating a place where one would like to go is consistent with a question about what 
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one would like to do, but it is unclear and the interlocutor would not understand what 
the participant intended to communicate; thus the answer passed the expressed 
content dimension, but not the speaker’s meaning dimension, and we therefore 
considered this as an intermediate error. In contrast, “I’d like to go to the cinema” is a 
response that is both consistent and plausible, and we considered it a fully correct 
response. On the extralinguistic scale, sharedness also concerns, for example, the 
amplitude of the gesture: the performed gesture has to be sufficiently ample and clear 
so that the interlocutor comprehends its meaning. 
Violation of cooperation and purpose of violation. In assessing the production 
of communicative acts, the violation of cooperation (truthfulness) and the purpose of 
violation (deceit or irony) are considered conjointly, because they cannot be evaluated 
independently in the participants’ answers (i.e., when the participant correctly 
produces a deceitful or ironic utterance, s/he necessarily produces a violation of 
cooperation with the purpose of deceiving or being ironic, unlike in comprehension 
tasks, where a participant may possibly understand the violation of the actor’s 
communicative act but not her/his purpose). Considered together, the two dimensions 
correspond to the communicative effect phase in the comprehension/generation 
process described in the Cognitive Pragmatics theory, but to avoid confusion with 
respect to the dimension used for scoring the comprehension task, the labels Violation 
of cooperation and purpose of violation were maintained in this study. The participant 
passed the dimension if s/he produced a communicative act fulfilling the requested 
goals for the communicative phenomenon in question. In the case of deceit, the 
participant had to say (on the linguistic scale) or communicate with a gesture (on the 
extralinguistic scale) something that was not true, with the purpose of hiding her/his 
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guilt/deceit. In the case of irony, the participant had to say or communicate something 
with the aim of joking or making fun. 
Please note that, as for comprehension, a wrong answer to this last dimension is 
usually regarded in the literature as proof of complete failure on the production task 
(see for example Bara, Tirassa & Zettin, 1997; Bara, Cutica & Tirassa, 2001; Angeleri 
et al. 2008; Dardier et al.). The intent of the present study is to further analyze the 
incorrect answers detected at the previous level. 
Finally, it is also important to note that the dimensions described above occupy 
hierarchical positions: passing one dimension presupposes having passed all the 
previous ones. This is based on the assumption that the comprehension and 
production of a given communicative act require a series of sequential inferential 
steps (see the Introduction section). For example, comprehending the speaker’s 
meaning implies having previously recognized the expressed content. Thus, if the 
participant immediately gives an answer that demonstrates an understanding of the 
speaker’s meaning, then the rater also considers the expressed content as passed. 
Results 
Reliability 
Cohen’s kappa procedure was used to investigate consistency of the scoring of 
participants’ responses by the two independent judges.  
The k value was .89 for the TBI group and .91 for the control group, indicating 
almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Overview of Communicative Performance of "Full Comprehension" 
The results showed that participants with CHI exhibited communicative deficits 
on all pragmatic tasks compared to normal controls. Statistical analyses were 
performed by including only the final scoring dimension, in line with the usual coding 
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approach in the current experimental literature (e.g., Angeleri et al., 2008; Dadier et 
al., 2011). This made it possible to evaluate the participants' general pragmatic 
performance, taking into account their achievements on the complete tasks (i.e., 
standard communicative acts, deceits, and ironies). In the next section (see Scaling of 
Communicative Dimensions - Intermediate Errors), the different components that 
constitute communicative acts will be considered, and each single scoring dimension 
will be examined. 
As a general overview, the CHI group performed worse than healthy controls in 
both the linguistic and the extralinguistic modalities (see Table 2). On the linguistic 
scale, participants with CHI performed worse than healthy controls on both 
comprehension (t(58) = 7.03, p < .0001, d = -1.85) and production tasks (t(58) = 4.52; 
p < .0001, d = -1.19), as well as on the extralinguistic scale, where they performed 
worse on both comprehension (T Test: t(58) = 6.21; p < .0001, d = -1.63) and 
production tasks (T Test: t(58) = 5.39; p < .0001, d = -1.41). 
 
- Insert Table 2 about here -  
 
Performance by participants with CHI and healthy controls also differed on 
each pragmatic task investigated (t ranging from 5.51 to 2.69, p ranging from .009 to 
< .0001). Table 3 displays scores obtained by the CHI and control groups.  
 
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
 
In the CHI group, no correlations were found between age, years of education, 
time post-injury, and scores on pragmatic tasks (-.08 < r < .1; .6 < p < .66). 
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Scaling of Communicative Dimension (Intermediate Errors) 
In this section the pragmatic performance of participants with CHI is analyzed 
in a new way, by examining the different dimensions that constitute the 
communicative acts.  
The following dimensions were taken into account in scoring participants' 
answers on production and comprehension tasks (see the Scoring section and 
Appendix A):  
• Expression Act (EA) 
• Actor’s Meaning (AM) 
• Violation of Cooperation (VC) 
• Purpose of Violation (PV) 
Since the above-listed scoring dimensions were hierarchically created (i.e., a 
correct response to one dimension implies correct responses to all previous 
dimensions), it is possible to identify specific patterns of responses. Table 4 
summarizes the possible patterns of responses. 
 
- Insert Table 4 about here -  
 
The diagram depicted in Table 4 provides all the potential patterns of 
occurrence of responses for comprehension and production tasks.  
More specifically, Table 4 reports the predicted patterns of responses by 
indicating passed dimensions with a “+” and failed dimensions with a “-”. So, for 
example, considering the case of “deceit and irony comprehension”, the following 
cases were possible: 
• Pattern I (totally wrong—no intermediate errors): the participant failed all 
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the scoring dimensions, i.e., her/his answer obtained “0” in all the four 
dimensions (expression act, actor’s meaning, violation, and purpose). This 
pattern was labeled as “totally wrong” as the participant did not pass even an 
initial step of comprehension of the communicative act.  
• Pattern II (intermediate errors) = the participant passed the expression act 
dimension, but failed the following dimensions (i.e., actor’s meaning, 
violation, and purpose). Pattern II is the first of the three intermediate error 
patterns, because the participant obtained a score of “1” in the first 
intermediate dimension (i.e., expression act). 
• Pattern III (intermediate errors) = the participant passed both the expression 
act and the actor’s meaning dimension, but failed the following dimensions 
(i.e., violation and purpose). Pattern III is the second of the three 
intermediate error patterns, because the participant obtained a score of “1” in 
the first two intermediate dimensions (i.e., expression act and actor’s 
meaning). 
• Pattern IV (intermediate errors) = the participant passed the expression act, 
the actor’s meaning, and the violation dimensions, but failed the following 
dimension (i.e., purpose). Pattern IV is the last of the three intermediate error 
patterns possibly occurring in the comprehension of deceit and irony, 
because the participant obtained a score of “1” in all the three intermediate 
dimensions (i.e., expression act, actor’s meaning, and violation). 
• Pattern V (fully passed—no intermediate errors) = the participant passed all 
the scoring dimensions, i.e., her/his answer obtained a score of “1” in all the 
four dimensions (expression act, actor’s meaning, violation, and purpose). 
This pattern was labeled as “fully passed” because the participant succeeded 
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in all the steps involved in the comprehension of the communicative act. No 
intermediate errors occurred.  
The different pragmatic phenomena investigated, i.e. production and 
comprehension of standard communicative acts, deceit and irony, were rated on 
an increasing number of dimensions, i.e. expression act, actor’s meaning, 
violation, and purpose. Thus, according to the specific pragmatic phenomena 
investigated, various patterns of intermediate errors emerged. 
Table 5 displays the mean frequencies of occurrence of each pattern across the 
different tasks for both groups (CHI and controls) on comprehension tasks; Table 6 
displays the mean frequencies of occurrence on production tasks. The means of the 
patterns identified for each group were calculated across all tasks.  
 
- Insert Table 5 about here - 
- Insert Table 6 about here - 
 
By way of example, the absolute frequencies for linguistic comprehension of 
deceit in the CHI group were found to be as follows: 
• Pattern I (totally wrong) = 5 
• Pattern II (intermediate errors) = 5 
• Pattern III (intermediate errors) = 2 
• Pattern IV (intermediate errors) = 17 
• Pattern V (correct) = 91 
Next, the mean frequencies were calculated by dividing each absolute frequency 
by 4 (i.e., the number of linguistic deceit comprehension tasks): 
• Pattern I = 1.25 
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• Pattern II = 1.25 
• Pattern III = 0.5 
• Pattern IV = 4.25 
• Pattern V = 22.75 
As shown in Table 5 and Table 6, intermediate patterns of responses occurred 
more frequently in the CHI group than in the control group. In other words, the CHI 
group made a higher number of intermediate errors, i.e., they failed to pass the last 
dimension (see Table 4), showing impairments at different levels of comprehension 
and production. 
Having analyzed the data corresponding to the "Correct" dimension, this section 
focuses on participants’ with CHI "intermediate errors".  
Logistic regression analysis was performed to establish the effect of group (CHI 
vs. controls) on the occurrence of intermediate errors. Logistic regression predicts the 
outcome of a binary criterion variable (i.e., the occurrence vs. absence of intermediate 
errors) based on one or more predictor variables (in this case, group membership). 
Nagelkerke’s R2 was employed to evaluate the goodness of fit of the logistic 
regression models. Nagelkerke’s R2 is the logistic analogue of R2 in linear regression, 
and quantifies the explanatory power of the independent variables as a whole. The 
values were thus dichotomized into “presence of intermediate errors” and “absence of 
intermediate errors”. Group membership significantly predicted the occurrence of 
intermediate errors in participants’ responses (b = 1.27, p < .0001, OR = 3.572, R2 = 
.12).  
An odds ratio (OR) of more than one indicated that group membership increases 
the occurrence of intermediate errors; specifically, being a member of the CHI group 
was associated with an increase of 3.572 times in the odds of committing errors. 
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The results were also comparable when considering each scale separately. 
Group membership significantly predicted the occurrence of intermediate errors on 
both the linguistic scale (b = 1.36, p < .0001, OR = 3.912, R2 = .13) and the 
extralinguistic scale (b = 1.21, p < .0001, OR = 3.368, R2 = .11). Moreover, being a 
member of the CHI group increased the odds of occurrence of intermediate errors on 
both comprehension tasks (b = 1.36, p < .0001, OR = 3.912, R2 = .13) and production 
tasks (b = 1.19, p < .0001, OR = 3.287, R2 = .11). 
Considering each task separately (see Tables 5 and 6), group membership 
significantly predicted the occurrence of intermediate errors on the following 
pragmatic tasks: linguistic comprehension (b = 1.253, p = .03, OR = 3.5, R2 = .11) and 
production of deceit (b = 1.604, p = .014, OR = 4.971, R2 = .16), linguistic 
comprehension of irony (b = 2.037, p = .001, OR = 7.667, R2 = .27), extralinguistic 
production of standard communicative acts (b = 2.093, p = .011, OR = 8.105, R2 = 
.21), extralinguistic comprehension (b = 1.394, p = .011, OR = 4.03, R2 = .14) and 
production of deceit (b = 2.277, p < .0001, OR = 9.75, R2 = .3), and extralinguistic 
production of irony (b = 1.325, p = .044, OR = 3.763, R2 = .11). The group 
membership predictor was not significant for: linguistic comprehension (b = 20.66, p 
= .998) and production of standard communicative acts (b = 19.817, p = .998), 
linguistic production of irony (b = .84, p = .157), extralinguistic comprehension of 
standard communicative acts (b = 19.817, p = .998), and extralinguistic 
comprehension of irony (b = .981, p = .096). Table 7 displays a summary of the 
logistic regression analysis. 
 
- Insert Table 7 about here -  
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Finally, Figure 1 displays the impairment profile of each participant in the CHI 
group. In this case, the number of times an intermediate pattern of errors occurred for 
each kind of task was calculated for each participant. More specifically, if a 
participant achieved intermediate patterns 3 times on the total of 4 items for the 
linguistic comprehension of deceit, she/he obtained 75% of intermediate errors.  
 
- Insert Figure 1 about here -  
 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to provide a qualitative and quantitative 
description of specific pragmatic errors made by participants with CHI in the 
comprehension and production of standard (direct and indirect) communicative acts, 
deceit and irony, expressed through both the linguistic and extralinguistic modalities. 
The intention was to go beyond the traditional scoring procedure used in the majority 
of empirical studies available in the current literature (see for example Bara, Tirassa 
& Zettin, 1997; Bara, Cutica & Tirasaa, 200; Angeleri et al. 2008, Dardier et al. 2011; 
but for an exception see McDonald et al. 2003) which, for the sake of simplicity and 
reliability, treat performance on a communicative task as "passed" or "failed" on the 
basis of a dichotomous "zero" or "one" coding criterion. The novelty of the present 
study lies in the use of a fine-grained scoring procedure articulated on different 
dimensions of evaluation, on the basis of a specific theoretical framework, i.e. the 
Cognitive Pragmatics theory (Bara, 2010) and in placing the empirical data within a 
theory whose assumptions hold for both normally-developed (Angeleri, Bosco, 
Gabbatore, Bara & Sacco, 2012) and brain-damaged subjects (Angeleri et al. 2008). 
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To obtain specific evaluation dimensions, during the administration of the 
experimental tasks the participants were asked to answer some specific questions 
designed to separately evaluate their ability to understand and produce the following 
aspects of a communicative act: (a) Expression act, that is the literal meaning of an 
utterance, (b) Actor's meaning, that is the actor's communicative intention, (c) 
Violation of cooperation, consisting in the capacity to understand that what is said is 
not true/not serious, as in the case of irony, and (d) Purpose of violation, consisting in 
the capacity to understand the reason why an actor produced a specific 
communicative act. 
In line with our expectations (see Bosco et al., 2006), the results showed that 
some aspects of communicative impairment in participants with CHI are better 
described in terms of "intermediate errors" rather than in terms of "all-or-none" loss 
of ability, the concept according to which a communicative act is either 
understood/produced or not 
Before analyzing the results concerning participants' intermediate errors 
following the new criteria described above, a preliminary analysis was conducted to 
compare CHI and control participants using the traditional coding system, that is, only 
considering the full comprehension/production of a communicative act. In line with 
the literature, the results showed that participants with CHI performed worse than 
controls on both the Linguistic and Extralinguistic scales, in both the comprehension 
and production of a communicative act, and in all the pragmatic phenomena 
investigated, i.e., standard (direct and indirect), irony and deceit. In particular the 
results of the present investigation are consistent with previous studies showing that 
participants with CHI perform worse, compared to controls, on the comprehension of 
standard acts (direct and indirect communicative acts), irony and deceit expressed 
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using linguistic (Bara, Tirassa & Zettin, 1997: McDonald, 2000; Martin & McDonald, 
2005) and extralinguistic modalities (Bara, Cutica & Tirassa, 2001).  Furthermore in 
line with Angeleri and colleagues (2008), the results of the present investigation 
showed that participants with CHI also perform worse, in comparison to normal 
controls, in the production of the same pragmatic phenomena produced using both the 
linguistic and extralinguistic modalities. This general alignment with previous studies 
suggests that the present data are reliable.  
The novelty of the present study is that it focuses attention on participants’ 
intermediate errors. Considering the participants’ wrong answers – or, in other words, 
incorrect answers normally coded as "zero" – it makes a distinction between "totally 
wrong" answers and the presence of "intermediate errors". The presence of 
"intermediate errors" corresponds to the achievement of a pass in at least one of the 
intermediate steps in the comprehension/production process described by the 
Cognitive Pragmatics theory. 
 Participants with CHI produced a higher percentage of intermediate errors 
than the control group, as revealed by a logistic regression analysis in which group 
membership significantly predicted the occurrence of intermediate errors in 
participants’ responses considering both the overall results and each scale (Linguistic 
vs. Extralinguistic) separately.  
Group membership also significantly predicted the occurrence of intermediate 
errors in participants’ responses when considering comprehension vs. production 
tasks separately. A more articulated pattern of results was obtained when considering 
each task separately: group membership significantly predicted the occurrence of 
intermediate errors in linguistic comprehension and production of deceit, linguistic 
comprehension of irony, extralinguistic production of standard communicative acts, 
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extralinguistic comprehension and production of deceit, and extralinguistic production 
of irony. By contrast, group membership was not a significant predictor of linguistic 
and extralinguistic comprehension and linguistic production of standard 
communicative acts, linguistic production and extralinguistic comprehension of irony. 
The lack of significance for these phenomena can be explained as follows. First, 
analyzing the different phenomena investigated separately made it possible to reduce 
the actual number of items analyzed. Second, most of the phenomena for which no 
significant difference emerged were those considered to be the easiest (that is 
standard communicative acts) and most difficult (namely the production of linguistic 
irony and the comprehension of extralinguistic irony; see Angeleri et al., 2008). As 
can be observed from performance by the control group, these tasks are also difficult 
for non-damaged individuals: a greater occurrence of intermediate patterns of errors 
was only observed in this group for the production of linguistic irony and 
comprehension of extralinguistic irony. Finally, the CHI participants were probably 
not a homogeneous group in their communicative performance; the present study 
refers to averaged data for individual communicative behaviors, as typically reported 
in experimental studies, which often have large within-group variability and 
inconsistent between-group differences (e.g., Angeleri et al., 2008; Body & Perkins, 
2004; Hein & Turkstra, 2002; Turkstra, Ciccia, & Seaton, 2003). 
Our theoretical analysis does indeed hold, in principle, not only for participants 
with CHI but also for non-damaged individuals. Usually, however, normally-
developed healthy people have a “ceiling” performance level, particularly on the 
simplest tasks such as standard communicative acts (Angeleri, et. al. 2012), and the 
comprehension/production of different communicative acts takes place directly in the 
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final stage of the process without that person’s answers revealing any intermediate 
levels of comprehension/production.  
Closed-head injury is interesting from this perspective because it does not 
involve one specific cerebral area, but, rather, it results in diffuse axonal injury, 
concerning all the cerebral networks involved in the communication process. The 
communicative deficit in participants with CHI results in neither a dichotomic 
impairment of communicative ability (i.e., full maintenance vs. full deficit) nor 
selective damage to one or more components. The results of the present study showed 
a graduated deficit in communicative ability, testified by the high frequency of 
intermediate errors in participants with CHI with respect to healthy controls, on all the 
pragmatic dimensions considered. This is in line with evidence from studies which 
have shown that pragmatic competence is not localized in a specific cerebral area, but 
involves several brain regions and connections, particularly on the frontal lobe 
(Douglas, 2010; Kasher et al., 1999; Stuss, Gallupp, & Alexander, 2001). 
Finally, some clinical considerations: Communication has a crucial role in 
setting and maintaining social relationships: impaired social ability represents one of 
the most destabilizing and invalidating sides of the condition (McDonald, Flanagan, 
Martin, & Saunders, 2004). For this reason it appears to be important to comprehend 
where people with traumatic brain injury fail in their comprehension process, in order 
to investigate whether and which communicative abilities are intact. The theoretical 
and empirical analyses conducted in this study offer a fine-grained modality for 
describing clinical observations concerning the gravity of a participants’ with CHI 
pragmatic deficits, for example it is possible to describe the gravity of a patient’s 
deficit on the basis of his/her difficulty to understand/produce the expression act, or 
the actor’s meaning, or the violation, and the purpose of a communicative act. 
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Communication is the expressive and receptive means through which it is 
possible to convey every form of clinical treatment, in both the psychotherapeutic and 
rehabilitative settings. For this reason it is necessary to have an in-depth 
understanding of the theoretical reasons that lead to communicative failures in people 
with CHI, in order to develop rehabilitation programs that are effective in helping 
them to overcome their impairment and recover their communicative abilities in their 
everyday interactions. This study offers some suggestions concerning the 
development of rehabilitation treatment. For example, during the rehabilitation 
treatment the therapist could formulate specific prompts to the patient, i.e. "What 
could you/he say...", "What do you/he mean by sayng...", "What do you/does he wish 
to obtain by saying...", depending on the specific communicative problem, i.e. failure 
to comprehend/produce the expression act, the actor's meaning, the violation or the 
purpose of a communicative act. Such kind of suggestions could be systematically 
integrated in a more articulated and comprehensive rehabilitation treatment and 
contribute to increase communicative patient's ability. 
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